rather than from discrepancies in attitudes toward political (e.g., censorship) 
I am a citizen of the United States of America. Our government has been overthrown. Our elected president has been exiled. Old White men wielding martinis and wearing Dickies have occupied our nation's capital.
- Moore (2002, p. 1) The ranchers most likely to be in financial trouble today are the ones who live the life and embody the values supposedly at the heart of the American West. They are independent and self-sufficient, cherish their freedom, believe in hard work-and as a result are now paying the price. . . . Hank died in 1998. He took his own life the week before Christmas. -Schlosser (2001, pp. 145-146) The common theme in the above quotes is a sense of indignation and alienation from modern America. The authors of these statements assert that traditional core values, such as democracy, freedom, and independence, are no longer being served by the country's power brokers. As a result, people may feel estranged from their culture and, to some, this estrangement (among other hardships) may be a source of distress and unhappiness. The statements make clear that estrangement is not something that you find only in history books about revolutions and hippies; estrangement is as palpable today as it has been in the past. The present research builds on some recent research that has begun to examine social psychological perspectives on this phenomenon (e.g., Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) by examining some previously untested hypotheses about the psychological underpinnings and consequences of estrangement.
Cultural Estrangement: Popular Culture Versus Societal Values
Cultural estrangement is a central component of the construct of alienation, which has been the focus of abundant sociological and philosophical inquiry (e.g., Fromm, 1941; Schacht, 1970) . Alienation has been viewed as a dissociation from popular cultural standards (Middleton, 1963) and a rejection of popular culture (Nettler, 1957) . In a seminal review of the literature, however, Schacht (1970) proposed that these conceptualizations failed to distinguish between popular culture and fundamental societal values. For example, Nettler (1957) defined the alienated person as "one who has been estranged from, made unfriendly toward his society and the culture it carries" (p. 671), and he assessed this type of alienation using questions that focused on the mass media, popular education, and conventional religion. Similarly, Middleton (1963) examined personalsocietal differences in preferences for television programs, movies, and popular magazines. Schacht (1970) suggested that both approaches failed to encompass topics that were exclusively related to societal values (e.g., political, legal, and family issues). Moreover, Schacht (1970) drew attention to sociological treatises, which focused on fundamental values. For example, Keniston (1965) reserved the term alienation for "an explicit rejection, 'freely' chosen by the individual, of what he perceives as the dominant values or norms of his society" (p. 455). In addition, Merton (1957) suggested that people who do not share "the common frame of values" constitute the true aliens in society. Finally, according to Parsons (1951) , alienation is "a possible product of something going wrong in the process of value-acquisition through identification" (p. 233).
Consistent with these perspectives, prior studies have assessed cultural estrangement by asking people to report their subjective sense of separation from dominant values or beliefs using self-report items that did not specify the particular values or beliefs (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998; Kohn & Schooler, 1983) . For example, one item in Cozzarelli and Karafa's (1998) 10-item measure states, "I strongly identify with American values" (reversed-scored) . This approach provides a useful gold standard for assessing cultural estrangement because it is most closely related to the explicit rejection of societal values that is central to definitions of cultural estrangement.
Nonetheless, it is possible that participants who report being culturally estranged on such measures feel separated from aspects of their culture that are not actually related to values per se because the measures leave participants free to conceptualize values. Such approaches assume that participants know what values are and can identify relevant values (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998) , and this assumption is tenuous because contemporary theories about values vary in their conceptual emphasis and describe a diverse array of ideals as values (Rohan, 2000) . Participants' understanding may or may not reflect the modal view of values, which indicates that values are conceptions of the desirable within every individual and society (Rokeach, 1979) and that they serve important guiding principles in people's lives (Schwartz, 1992) . Participants also may fail to consider a diverse collection of values. The potential diversity is captured in Schwartz's (1992 Schwartz's ( , 1996 well-known cross-cultural model, which proposes that values represent three universal requirements of human existence: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interactions, and survival welfare of groups. On the basis of these needs, Schwartz (1992) distinguished between 10 types of values, which express different motivations: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. The dynamic relations among the 10 value types are central to the model. Schwartz (1992) predicts that the 10 value types can be arranged in a circumplex structure and form four higher-order value domains (see Figure 1) . In this structure, the pursuit of adjacent values is compatible, whereas the pursuit of opposite values generates conflict. For example, individuals who emphasize power values also tend to place importance on achievement and security but less importance on benevolence and selfdirection values. The circumplex model has been supported using factor analysis and smallest space analysis of value ratings in more than 200 samples from more than 60 countries (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 1996 Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004) . Thus, the model yields an important set of dimensions to consider when assessing cultural estrangement.
Both Rokeach's (1973) and Schwartz's (1992) conceptualizations of values encourage the assessment of personal and societal values, thereby permitting a direct examination of cultural estrangement. Rokeach (1979) argued that it is just as meaningful to speak of cultural, societal, institutional, organisational, and group values as it is to speak of individual values. If individual values are socially shared cognitive representations of personal needs and the means for satisfying them, then institutional values are socially shared cognitive representations of institutional goals and demands. (p. 50) Similarly, Schwartz (1992) argued that it is meaningful to assess institutional and cultural values, suggesting that perceived normative ideals could be measured with the [Schwartz Value] survey if the referent used to anchor the questions were modified. For example, respondents could be asked: "How important is value X as a guiding principle in people's lives, in the eyes of (culture group Y)?" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 51) This approach would permit a direct test of the assumption that the subjective sense of cultural estrangement arises from actually perceived discrepancies between personal and societal values. In other words, this technique to measure cultural estrangement spells out specific values (rather than leaving values unspecified) and enables the respondent to compare directly the extent to which he or she and society possess the values.
This approach would facilitate several other important tests. First, we could better assess whether reports of cultural estrangement, using extant measures, actually reflect perceived value discrepancies over and above perceived differences between personal attitudes and societal attitudes. Such a pattern would be consistent with theories asserting the importance of values in cultural estrangement (e.g., Seeman, 1959 Seeman, , 1975 Seeman, , 1991 and with theories suggesting that values are among the most fundamental social psychological constructs (Feather, 1990; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992 Schwartz, , 1996 because of their importance as guiding principles and their centrality in people's cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003; Gold & Robbins, 1979; Gold & Russ, 1977; Thomsen, Lavine, & Kounios, 1996) . In contrast to values, attitudes are merely dispositions to evaluate an attitude object (e.g., censorship, ice cream) with some degree of favor or disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) . Consequently, attitudes are rated using scales reflecting varying degrees of favorability toward an object, whereas values are rated in terms of their importance as guiding principles in one's life.
Second, this direct test may reveal whether people feel estranged from some societal values but not others. For example, Keniston (1965) argued that his alienated participants (young adults) placed high emphasis on values such as "feeling, sentience, passion, and appreciation" (p. 192) . These values stand in contrast to society's perceived emphasis on values such as "problem-solving, cognitive control, work, measurement, rationality, and analysis" (p. 366). Similarly, Merton (1957 , cited in Schacht, 1970 proposed that the fundamental value of American society was the endless accumulation of wealth and prestige and that people who rejected these values were the "true aliens" in American society. Given these theories, it is possible that cultural estrangement in American, and perhaps Western societies more generally (Glatzer, Daniel, & Short, 2004; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) , is more closely related to estrangement from the self-enhancement values (e.g., ambition, wealth, and power) described in Schwartz's model than to estrangement from other types of values (e.g., openness values). The direct assessment of personal and societal values would enable an examination of this issue.
Value Discrepancies and Subjective Well-Being
This approach also can be used to examine more directly the notion that discrepancies between personal and societal value priorities have maladaptive consequences for individuals. Although prior research has not directly examined these personal-societal discrepancies across a specific set of values, several programs of research have examined the potential effects of discrepancies between personal values and the values of specific groups, such as family members or academic departments. For example, Feather and Cross (1975) found that the discrepancies between adolescents' values and their perception of their parents' values were far greater for delinquents than for nondelinquents. In addition, Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) found that business students and psychology students experienced a more positive sense of well-being when their personal values were congruent with the values promoted by their respective academic departments. Similarly, Rohan and Maiden (2000, as cited by Rohan, 2000) found that teachers who experienced greater congruity between their values and their school's values reported lower stress, more job commitment, and more satisfaction. These programs of research suggest that discrepancies between personal values and the values of important reference groups may have negative consequences.
Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether discrepancies between personal and societal values predict subjective well-being. A study by Cozzarelli and Karafa (1998) suggests that these value discrepancies might not predict well-being. Their measure of cultural estrangement possesses two subscales. Their Atypical subscale assesses the extent to which individuals feel that their values and beliefs are similar (or different) from PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN most people in society (e.g., "I feel that my opinions in important matters are similar to the opinions of typical or average Americans"). Their Misfit subscale assesses a more general feeling of not fitting in with others (e.g., "People, on occasion, tell me that I am different"). Across two studies, they found that high scores on the Misfit subscale were associated with poorer psychological outcomes (e.g., self-esteem, anxiety, and depression), anomy, and social isolation. In contrast, the Atypical scale was not related to these variables. Thus, Cozzarelli and Karafa's (1998) research did not support the notion that estrangement from societal values per se predicts poorer subjective well-being. There are several ways in which the direct assessment of personal-societal value discrepancies provides an important way to further examine this issue. First, the elicitation of specific values enables us to test whether estrangement from particular societal values is healthy, whereas estrangement from other values is not. For example, Ryan (1993, 1996) have found that individuals who place importance on values associated with achievement and power (e.g., financial success, social recognition) have poorer subjective well-being than individuals who place more importance on selfdirection and benevolence values (e.g., choosing own goals, helpfulness). Thus, it is possible that estrangement from societal values on these dimensions also may be uniquely linked to subjective well-being.
Alternatively, Cozzarelli and Karafa's (1998) findings may be essentially correct because some people may take pride in not identifying with mainstream values (Schacht, 1970) . In other words, people who have high discrepancies between personal and societal values may consciously seek such differences because of a higher need for uniqueness (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) . According to Snyder and Fromkin (1980) , people who have a high need for uniqueness like to feel different from their peers. In particular, college students like to achieve a sense of uniqueness by advocating attitudes, beliefs, and values that they believe are uniquely selfdefining (Fromkin & Demming, 1967 , cited in Snyder & Fromkin, 1980 . These unique attitudes, beliefs, and values should then help satisfy or lower the need for uniqueness.
Nevertheless, our hypothesis is that high need for uniqueness is distinctly related to value discrepancies, rather than political and mundane attitude discrepancies, because of values' central relation to the self (Rokeach, 1973 ). The present research tested whether the need for uniqueness predicts higher cultural estrangement through this relation to personal-societal value discrepancies. This evidence would be consistent with the notion that cultural estrangement can fulfill a basic psychological need, which at least partly counteracts any potential negative repercussions of the discrepancies on subjective well-being. Thus, people with a high need for uniqueness may possess stronger personal and societal value discrepancies, which predicts more positive subjective well-being for these individuals.
The Present Research
In two studies, we directly assessed perceived personal-societal value discrepancies across a range of values, as suggested by other researchers (e.g., Feather & Cross, 1975; Hamid & James, 1973; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1979; Schwartz, 1992) . Thus, participants were asked to complete a measure of their personal values and a measure of their perceptions of society's values. We used these questionnaires to assess the participants' perceived estrangement from societal values for each of the four higher-order value domains described by Schwartz (see Figure 1 ). Because cultural estrangement can incorporate elements other than social values (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998; cf. Schacht, 1970) , our first study also assessed attitudes toward a range of political issues and mundane items at both the personal and societal level. Using these measures (and others), Study 1 tested whether (a) value discrepancies predicted cultural estrangement over and above political and mundane attitude discrepancies, (b) value discrepancies are related to subjective well-being and need for uniqueness, and (c) discrepancies in certain values uniquely predict cultural estrangement, subjective well-being, and need for uniqueness. As we describe below, Study 2 replicated most aspects of this design while also using peer ratings of participants' values to follow up some issues raised by the findings of Study 1.
METHOD

Participants
Participants were 72 undergraduate students (16 men, 56 women) at Cardiff University who participated for course credit. Their mean age was 19.15 years. Data from three additional participants were deleted from the analyses because the participants failed to follow instructions.
Overview
Participants took part individually. They were told that participation involved completing a number of surveys examining their attitudes toward various topics. Three sets of questionnaires were used. One set assessed values, political attitudes, and mundane attitudes at the personal level. The second set assessed values, political attitudes, and mundane attitudes at the societal level. The final set contained measures of cultural estrangement, subjective well-being, and uniqueness. The position of the questionnaires in each set was randomized across participants. The presentation order of the three sets of questionnaires also was counterbalanced across participants. Finally, participants completed a questionnaire that elicited demographic information, placed their responses in a blank envelope to ensure anonymity, and were debriefed.
Personal and Societal Measures
We made our measures of personal and societal values, political attitudes, and mundane attitudes similar in form and length. The personal and societal measures of each variable included 28 items, which participants rated on 9-point scales.
Values. The 28 values were representative of the four higher-order domains in the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992) and were identified by Schwartz (1992, p. 28) as having the most common meaning across the 20 countries used in his analysis.
1 For the personal version of the value survey, participants were asked to rate the importance of each value as a guiding principle in their life. For the societal version of the value survey, participants responded to the same values as in the personal version but were instructed to rate the importance of each value as a guiding principle for people in British Society (see Schwartz, 1992) . In both versions, participants rated the importance of the values using a 9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not important), 3 (important), 6 (very important), to 7 (extremely important), except that the label for -1 was replaced with opposed to British Society's values in the societal version. Schwartz (1992) advocates the use of this scale because most values in the measure are at least somewhat important to people but an option should be provided to encourage disagreement with the values.
Political attitudes. The 28 political attitude issues were adapted from previously published measures of political attitudes (e.g., Maio, Roese, Seligman, & Katz, 1996 ; see also Ashton et al., 2005) . All of the items referred to political issues that are typically important to people (e.g., racial integration, death penalty, social welfare, legalized cannabis). Half of the items could be construed as endorsing liberal policies (e.g., legalized abortion, increased immigration) and half as endorsing conservative policies (censorship, royal family).
In the personal measures of political attitudes, participants were asked to rate their own favorability toward the issues. In the societal measures of political attitudes, participants were asked to rate British society's attitude regarding each social issue. In both versions, attitudes were rated using a 9-point scale ranging from -4 (extremely unfavorable) to +4 (extremely favorable), except that the phrase "British Society is" was inserted before the scale labels in the societal version.
Mundane attitudes. The mundane attitude objects were different food and beverages (e.g., diet cola, milk, pizza), which have been used as mundane attitude objects in past research (e.g., Esses & Maio, 2002; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989) . Participants responded to each item using the same 9-point scale that was used for the political attitudes.
Subjective Well-Being
Anxiety-depression. Participants completed the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) , which contains 14 items. Example items are "I feel tense or 'wound up,'" (anxiety) and "I feel as if I am slowed down" (depression). Participants responded to each item using a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (most of the time). As in previous research (e.g., Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) , scores on the anxiety and depression scales were highly correlated so they were combined to form one scale, such that high scores reflected high amounts of anxiety and depression (M = 1.99, SD = .31). Internal reliability was adequate (a = .71).
Self-actualization.
Participants completed the 14-item Self-Actualization Scale (Jones & Crandall, 1986) . Example items are "It is better to be yourself than to be popular" and "I have no mission in life to which I feel especially dedicated" (reverse-scored). Participants responded to the items using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We calculated participants' score by averaging their response to the scales items (M = 4.58, SD = .58). Internal reliability was adequate (a = .69).
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Estrangement and Uniqueness
Cultural Estrangement Inventory (CEI). The original 10-item version of the CEI (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) assesses differences between personal beliefs and values and American beliefs and values. We adapted the inventory for use in a British sample by substituting the label "British" for "American." The Atypical subscale of this inventory assesses a sense of difference from society's beliefs and values (e.g., "I feel that my opinions in important matters are similar to the opinions of typical or average British people" and "I strongly identify with British values"). The Misfit subscale assesses a sense of not fitting in with society (e.g., "I feel that I am very different as compared to what society would call a normal person" and "I often feel that somehow I don't fit in"). Respondents indicated their agreement with each item using a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We calculated participants' scores for the whole CEI by averaging their responses to all 10 items (M = 3.70, SD = 1.10) and for each subscale by averaging their responses to the scales' constituent items. Participants scored slightly higher on the Atypical scale (M = 3.95, SD = 1.20) than the Misfit scale (M = 3.44, SD = 1.23). Internal reliability for the two subscales (Atypical a = .85, Misfit a = .86) and the total CEI scale (a = .88) were very good.
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Cultural Estrangement Scale (CES). Kohn and Schooler's (1983) CES measures differences between personal beliefs and the beliefs of one's primary and secondary groups. Participants used a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time) to indicate how often their ideas and opinions about important matters differ from those of their relatives, mother, father, friends, and most people in the country. These ratings can be averaged to form a mean cultural estrangement score (M = 3.01, SD = .46). Although Kohn and Schooler's (1983) scale does not specifically mention values, the emphasis on important ideas and opinions is consistent with definitions of values as important beliefs and guiding principles (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) . Internal reliability was slightly low (a = .64).
Uniqueness. Snyder and Fromkin's (1980) 32-item scale was used to measure participants' desire to be different from others. Sample items included, "I do not always live by the rules and standards of society" and "Whenever I take part in group activities, I am somewhat of a nonconformist." Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We calculated participants' scores for Uniqueness by averaging their responses to all 32 items (M = 4.17, SD = .50). Internal reliability was adequate (a = .76).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We chose the CEI (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) as our principal measure of cultural estrangement as opposed to Kohn and Schooler's (1983) estrangement scale because (a) it is more orientated toward dominant societal values and, thus, accurately reflects the dominant conception of cultural estrangement (Seeman, 1959 (Seeman, , 1975 (Seeman, , 1991 , (b) it has stronger discriminant and predictive validity, and (c) its subscales enabled us to investigate different types of cultural estrangement identified by Cozzarelli and Karafa (1998) . However, Kohn and Schooler's (1983) measure was included in analyses that required a measure of estrangement at both primary (e.g., family, friends) and secondary (society) group levels.
Values, Political Attitudes, and Mundane Attitude Discrepancies
We first tested whether discrepancies between personal and societal values uniquely contributed to cultural estrangement, subjective well-being, and need for uniqueness over and above discrepancies between personal and societal political attitudes and discrepancies between personal and societal mundane attitudes. This analysis involved constructing indices of the absolute differences between measures of personal and societal values, political attitudes, and mundane attitudes. We calculated the discrepancies between participants' personal and societal values across the four higher-order value domains described by Schwartz (1992) . The first step for these calculations required calculating the absolute magnitude of the personal-societal discrepancy for each value. These discrepancies were then summed across all of the values across all four domains to provide discrepancy indices for conservation (M = 1.65, SD = .85), openness (M = 1.64, SD = 1.12), self-enhancement (M = 1.74, SD = 1.13), and self-transcendence (M = 1.80, SD = 1.24) values. To compute the political attitude discrepancies and the mundane attitude discrepancies, the first step involved calculating the absolute magnitude of the personal-societal discrepancy for each attitude. These discrepancies were then summed across the whole scales. This resulted in separate global discrepancy indices for values, political attitudes, and mundane attitudes. We separately examined the relation between (a) these three discrepancy indices and (b) estrangement, subjective well-being, and need for uniqueness.
Estrangement
As shown in Table 1 , participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal values or political attitudes reported more cultural estrangement (CEI) than did participants who perceived a smaller gap in values or political attitudes. In contrast, there was no significant relation between the mundane attitude discrepancies and cultural estrangement.
We then tested whether the three global discrepancy indices independently predicted cultural estrangement by conducting a regression analyses in which the three discrepancy indices were entered as simultaneous predictors of estrangement. The results indicated a significant effect of value discrepancies, b = .47, t(68) = 4.34, p < .001, and political attitude discrepancies, b = .22, t(68) = 2.14, p < .05, and no effect of mundane attitude discrepancies, b = -.07, t(68) = -.63, ns. Thus, only the value and political attitude discrepancies uniquely predicted cultural estrangement, with values being the most powerful predictor of estrangement.
There is a similar pattern of results for Kohn and Schooler's (1983) measure of cultural estrangement. As shown in Table 1 , only the value and political attitude discrepancies were significantly related to cultural estrangement (CES). Furthermore, when all three discrepancy indices were entered as simultaneous predictors of total estrangement, there was a significant effect of value discrepancies, b = .33, t(68) = 2.82, p < .01, but only a marginal effect of political attitude discrepancies, b = .21, t(68) = 1.91, p < .07, and no effect of mundane attitude discrepancies, b = -.04, t(68) = -.36, ns.
In addition, using Kohn and Schooler's (1983) measure, we examined the relation between the three discrepancy indices and estrangement from different social groups. As shown in Table 2 , participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal values believed that they differed from most people in the country in relation to important ideas and opinions, r(70) = .46, p < .001. Unexpectedly, participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal attitudes toward mundane objects also believed that they differed from most people in the country in relation to important ideas and opinions, r(70) = .31, p < .01. However, when all three discrepancy indices were entered as simultaneous predictors of estrangement from most people in the country, results indicated a significant effect of value discrepancies, b = .40, t(68) = 3.76, p < .001, and a weaker effect of mundane attitude discrepancies, b = .21, t(68) = 2.04, p < .05. The effect of the political attitude discrepancies was not significant, b = .15, t(68) = 1.43, ns. In addition, participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal values and political attitudes also believed that they marginally differed from their friends on important ideas and beliefs, r(70) = .21, p < .10, and r(70) = .19, p < .10, respectively.
Need for Uniqueness
As shown in Table 1 , participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal values expressed a higher need for uniqueness. Need for uniqueness was not related to discrepancies between personal and societal political attitudes or between personal and societal mundane attitudes (all ps > .30). We then tested whether the three global discrepancy indices independently predicted need for uniqueness by entering the three discrepancy indices as simultaneous predictors of uniqueness. Results indicated a significant effect of value discrepancies, b = .26, t(68) = 2.19, p < .05, on need for uniqueness. Political attitude discrepancies and mundane attitude discrepancies did not significantly predict need for uniqueness, b = .10, t(68) = .86, ns, and b = -.09, t(68) = -.77, ns, respectively. Thus, only the value discrepancies uniquely predicted need for uniqueness.
Subjective Well-Being
As shown in Table 1 , there were no relations between any of the discrepancy indices and anxiety-depression or self-actualization. This result is examined further in Study 2.
Regression Approach to Discrepancies
The "directionless" quality of absolute scores and unequal variances between the separate components can make it difficult to interpret clearly results from absolute discrepancies alone (Edwards, 1994; Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999) . Griffin et al. (1999) advocated the use of additional multiple regression procedures to aid interpretation. Therefore, we employed these techniques to establish that the relations between (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) ; A = Atypical subscale; M = Misfit subscale; CES = Cultural Estrangement Scale (Kohn & Schooler, 1983) ; AD = Anxiety-depression; SA = Self-actualization; U = Uniqueness. † p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Mediation
As expected, the results above indicated that value discrepancies uniquely predicted cultural estrangement and need for uniqueness. In addition, participants who possessed higher scores on the Cozzarelli and Karafa (1998) measure of cultural estrangement also exhibited higher need for uniqueness, r(70) = .55, p < .001. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that possession of different values from society may fulfill a need for uniqueness rather than being the adverse psychological state implied by the traditional notion of alienation. This view was supported by a marginal tendency for participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal values to express higher self-actualization, r(70) = .22, p < .07. More important, this reasoning was supported by a series of regression analyses that tested whether the relation between need for uniqueness and cultural estrangement (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998 ) is mediated by the ability of the value discrepancies to fulfill this need (as described in our introduction). Using procedures recommended by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998), we predicted and found that the relation between need for uniqueness and cultural estrangement was significantly reduced, b = .46, t(68) = 4.88, p < .001, when value discrepancies were statistically controlled, Sobel test, z = 2.08, p < .04. This result supports the hypothesis that a high need for uniqueness causes people to perceive greater value discrepancies, which lead to a stronger experience of cultural estrangement.
Algebraic Higher-Order Value Discrepancies
Among other results, the above analyses verified that value discrepancies uniquely predicted cultural estrangement. To further understand these relations, it was important to test whether the algebraic differences between participants' value discrepancies were related to cultural estrangement. This examination of algebraic differences enabled us to test whether culturally estranged participants felt that they place relatively high or low importance on particular value types.
To examine this issue, raw ratings for each value on the societal value survey were subtracted from the raw ratings for each value on the personal value survey. Thus, higher differences reflected a perception that the participant cherished a value more than society. We then summed the algebraic discrepancy scores across the values in each of the four higher-order value domains and examined the relation between these four algebraic discrepancy scores and cultural estrangement. As shown in Table 3 , participants who believed that they endorsed self-transcendence and openness values more than society reported greater cultural estrangement than participants who believed that they placed less emphasis on self-transcendence and openness values. In contrast, participants who believed that they endorsed selfenhancement values more than society reported less cultural estrangement than participants who believed that they placed less emphasis on self-enhancement values. There is a similar pattern with Kohn and Schooler's (1983) measure of cultural estrangement (see Table 3 ). In addition, when the personal importance of the higher order values was controlled (ratings on personal value survey), the relation between the higher order value discrepancies and estrangement remained significant for self-transcendence values, b = .35, t(69) = 2.71, p < .01, and marginally significant for openness values, b = .23, t(69) = 1.79, p < .10. However, the relation between discrepancies on self-enhancement values and estrangement was no longer significant, b = -.20, t(69) = -1.40, ns, after controlling for the personal importance of selfenhancement values. Thus, cultural estrangement was predicted by the tendency to see personal values as being more strongly oriented toward the welfare of others and (to a lesser extent) freedom, over and above differences in the endorsement of the values themselves.
Group Estrangement and Subjective Well-Being
Despite the null relations between value discrepancies and subjective well-being, it remains possible that cultural estrangement has some role to play in subjective well-being. Participants who reported more cultural estrangement as measured by the CEI (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) were more anxious-depressed, and this result was driven mainly by scores on the misfit subscale (see Note 3). Participants who reported more cultural estrangement on the CES (Kohn & Schooler, 1983 ) also experienced more anxiety-depression. However, this relation depended on the target group from which participants reported estrangement. As shown in Table 2 , participants who differed from their friends on important ideas and opinions were more anxious-depressed, r(70) = .27, p < .05, than were participants who did not differ from their friends. However, participants who indicated that they have different ideas and opinions from most people in the country were not more anxiousdepressed (all ps > .10). Together, these findings indicate that "primary group" estrangement predicts subjective well-being better than broader cultural estrangement.
STUDY 2
The direct assessment of personal-societal value discrepancies in Study 1 afforded a useful extension of past research by identifying values for respondents and by directly examining many relevant values. This assessment enabled us to verify that cultural estrangement is most powerfully predicted by perceived discrepancies between personal values and societal values, over and above perceived differences between personal and societal attitudes toward political issues and mundane objects. It also helped to pinpoint particular value discrepancies at the heart of the experience of estrangement, and we will return to this important benefit in the General Discussion.
An additional interesting result was the nonsignificant relation between value discrepancies and subjective well-being. This finding is both consistent (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) and inconsistent (Rohan & Maiden, 2000; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000) with previous research. Consequently, in Study 2, we sought to further examine this result by testing whether we could replicate it in a new sample with additional measures relevant to subjective well-being: life satisfaction and self-esteem. Because past research has found high correlations between wellbeing, life satisfaction, and self-esteem (for a review, see Myres & Diener, 1995) , we expected to find similar patterns for all three constructs.
In addition, we wished to test whether this result is driven by biases in self-ratings of values. It could be argued that participants misrepresent their values as a means of looking better or worse than society. As indicated above, participants who were estranged from society saw their own values as more self-transcendence oriented and less self-enhancement oriented than participants who were less estranged. Were the estranged participants simply trying to highlight their own "unselfishness?" If so, this pattern should not be detected when we ask peers to report the participants' values, and participants' ratings of their values should not correlate with their peers' ratings of their values. To our knowledge, prior research has not used peer data to check the accuracy of participants' reports of their values. Peer corroboration of participants' ratings would help to bolster confidence in the validity of the participants' value discrepancy ratings.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 66 undergraduate students (12 men, 54 women) at Cardiff University who participated for course credit. Their mean age was 19.71 years. Data from 6 additional participants from foreign countries (not Britain) were deleted from the analyses. The peer ratings were completed by a friend of each participant, respectively. We obtained peer ratings from 45 friends of the 66 participants. Participants with peer responses did not differ significantly from participants without peer responses on any of our measures.
Overview
Participants took part in groups of three to six persons. They were told that participation involved completing a number of surveys examining their attitudes toward various topics. Three sets of questionnaires were used (presented in the order of appearance): The first set assessed values at the personal level, the second set assessed values at the societal level, and the final set contained measures of life satisfaction, subjective wellbeing, uniqueness, self-esteem, and demographic information. The measures of personal values, societal values, anxiety-depression, self-actualization, and need for uniqueness were the same as in Study 1. The remaining measures are described below.
At the end of the study, participants were asked to take away a questionnaire in an envelope. We asked the participants to give the envelope to a good friend of theirs who would be willing to complete the questionnaire. Participants were informed that the completion of the questionnaire would take no longer than 5 min. They were told that they would get extra course credit for finding a friend and bringing the envelope back to us and that their friends would receive 2 pounds sterling (US$3.80) as compensation. Participants were instructed to (a) find a friend who did not participate in this study before, (b) create a surrounding for their friends similar to the conditions they had in the present study (no music, television, and other inferences), (c) not tell the 86 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) ; AT = Atypical subscale; MI = Misfit subscale; CES = Cultural Estrangement Scale (Kohn & Schooler, 1983 ). † p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
friend anything about the study (because the envelope contained all instructions), and (d) respect the confidentiality of their friend's responses. All participants agreed with this procedure and took away a questionnaire for a friend.
Peer Ratings of Personal Values
The participants' friends responded to the same values as in the self-rating version of the personal values, except that they were asked to rate the importance of each value as a guiding principle in their friend's life (i.e., in the life of the participant).
Life Satisfaction
Participants completed the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) , which contains five items. Example items are, "In most ways my life is close to my ideal" and "If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing." Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). Participants' scores on each item were averaged to calculate a mean life satisfaction score (M = 5.28, SD = 1.13). Internal reliability was good (a = .83).
Self-Esteem
Participants completed the Self-Liking/SelfCompetence Scale-Revised Version (SLSCS-R; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001 ), which contains 16 items. The scale is divided into a Self-Liking subscale and a SelfCompetence subscale. Each subscale contains 8 items. Example items for the Self-Liking subscale are "I am very comfortable with myself" and "I feel great about who I am." Example items for the Self-Competence subscale are "I am highly effective at the things I do" and "I am very talented." Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). Mean scores were similar for the SelfLiking (M = 4.25, SD = 1.18) and Self-Competence (M = 4.16, SD = .78) subscales. The internal reliabilities for the two subscales (Self-Liking a = .92, Self-Competence a = .81) were good.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Value Discrepancies, Need for Uniqueness, and Subjective Well-Being
We first tested whether the data replicated the positive relation between self-reported value discrepancies and need for uniqueness and the null correlations between value discrepancies and subjective well-being (including the new measures of life satisfaction and selfesteem). As shown in Table 4 , participants who perceived a larger gap between personal and societal values expressed a higher need for uniqueness. In contrast, as expected, there were no relations between value discrepancies and anxiety-depression, self-actualization, life satisfaction, self-liking, self-competence, and selfesteem (calculated as the mean of self-liking and selfcompetence). Taken together, these results fit the findings of Study 1: Value discrepancies predicted a higher need for uniqueness but were not related to poor psychological outcomes.
Self-Report and Peer-Report
Given the replication of Study 1, we examined the validity of the self-reported personal values using the peer ratings of participants' values. If the self-reported personal values are consistent with friends' estimates of the participants' personal values, any differences between self-reported personal values and societal values should be in the same direction as the differences between peer-reported personal values and societal values, whereas the self-reported personal values and the peer-reported personal values should not differ significantly. As shown in Table 5 , paired samples t tests revealed significant differences between personal values and societal values and similar significant differences between peer-reported personal values and the societal values. Consistent with the findings of Study 1, participants and their friends indicated that self-transcendence NOTE: U = Uniqueness; AD = Anxiety-depression; SA = Self-actualization; LS = Life satisfaction; SL = Self-liking; SC = Self-competence; SE = Selfesteem (mean of SL and SC). *p < .05.
values and openness values were more important for the participant than for society, whereas self-enhancement values were less important for the participant than for society. Participants and friends reported no difference in the importance of the participant's conservation values and society's conservation values. Moreover, across the domains, the self-reported personal values and the peer-reported personal values did not significantly differ.
A second way to test the validity of our self-report value discrepancy measure is to examine the correlations between self-reported personal value importance and peer-reported personal value importance. If participants are reporting their values accurately, their ratings of their values should be significantly correlated with their friends' ratings of their (the participants') values. Following the procedure cited by Schwartz (e.g., 1992 ), we examined the correlations between the self-reported and peer-reported values for the four higher value domains (see Figure 1 ) while controlling for the mean importance of all personal values (self-report and peerreport measure). As expected, self-reported personal value importance and peer-reported personal value importance were strongly correlated (see Table 6 ). In contrast, if the participants are reporting societal values independently of their personal true values, their estimates of societal values should not converge with their friends' estimates of their values. To test this prediction, we examined the correlations between self-reported societal value importance and mean importance of the peer-reported personal value importance while controlling the mean importance of the societal values and the peer-reported participants' values. As shown in Table 6 , self-reported societal value importance and peerreported personal value importance were not significantly correlated. Thus, participants' ratings of their own values but not of societal values corresponded with their friends' estimates of the participants' values, providing further evidence for the validity of the participants' value ratings.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of Study 1 indicated that participants who perceived larger discrepancies between (a) personal and societal values and (b) personal and societal political attitudes experienced more cultural estrangement than did participants who perceived smaller discrepancies in values and political attitudes. In contrast, participants who perceived larger discrepancies in mundane attitudes were not more culturally estranged. More important, when all three types of discrepancies were entered as simultaneous predictors of cultural estrangement, the value discrepancies were the most predictive of cultural estrangement. This finding occurred even though references to important matters other than values were equally embedded in our primary measure of cultural estrangement (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) . Furthermore, this pattern was replicated with another measure of cultural estrangement (Kohn & Schooler, 1983) that does not explicitly mention social values. In this analysis, value discrepancies remained the most powerful predictor of cultural estrangement. Overall, these findings are consistent with prior theory (Seeman, 1959 (Seeman, , 1975 (Seeman, , 1991 and support the view that values are the key variable in cultural estrangement (Keniston, 1965; Parsons, 1951 , cited in Schacht, 1970 and more generally support the notion that values are more central constructs than attitudes (Rokeach, 1973) .
Yet, the effects of the personal-societal value discrepancies were not equal across all types of values. Although all four value motives were correlated with estrangement, the nature of the value discrepancies varied across different types of values. As predicted by Keniston (1965) , estrangement was highest among those participants who believed that societal values were less con- cerned with the welfare of others. As far as we are aware, this is the first empirical demonstration that estrangement from societal values does not necessarily imply estrangement from all societal values. Instead, cultural estrangement is a more complicated phenomenon that is rooted in particular value differences.
An interesting issue for future research is whether the same or different value discrepancies predict estrangement in different cultures. Prior research indicates that some cultures emphasize collective goals more than individualistic concerns (Triandis, 1995) and that attainment of culturally compatible goals is related to subjective well-being (Oishi & Diener, 2001 ). In collectivist cultures, estrangement may be highest when individuals endorse values that are less compatible with collectivist goals, such as self-direction values (e.g., independence, choosing own goals). Our findings make the crosscultural effects of value discrepancies an interesting issue.
Subjective Well-Being: Cultural Estrangement Versus Cultural Emancipation
In both studies, there were no relations between personal-societal value discrepancies and any of the measures of subjective well-being, including anxietydepression, self-actualization, life satisfaction, and selfesteem. Given the centrality of values in people's cognitive networks (Rokeach, 1973) and evidence suggesting that value discrepancies can have negative consequences (e.g., Rohan & Maiden, 2000; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000) , the failure of the discrepancy indices to predict subjective well-being is interesting.
One potential explanation for this result is that participants see their own values in a way that is different from reality. Specifically, they may perceive their own values in a way that would make themselves seem "better than average," thereby attenuating negative links between the discrepancies and estrangement. The results of Study 2 failed to support this view. In this study, peer estimates of participants' values yielded the same pattern of value discrepancies that had driven cultural estrangement in Study 1: Peers rated participants' self-transcendence values and openness values as more important for the participant than for society, whereas peers rated participants' self-enhancement values as less important for the participant than for society. When considered with the high correlations between self-ratings and peer ratings of the personal values, it is less likely that the reported value discrepancies are simply attributable to participants' idiosyncratic biases.
A second potential explanation for this result is that value discrepancies must be more salient to significantly affect subjective well-being. Our participants might not have been consciously aware of value discrepancies while completing our separate lists of personal and societal values. Perhaps if participants reported each personal value immediately before or after each societal value, participants who reported large discrepancies would become more aware of the discrepancies and, consequently, feel lower subjective well-being. Indeed, one of the important techniques for changing values elicits self-dissatisfaction by making people aware of discrepancies between personal and peer values (Rokeach, 1973) .
Nonetheless, the second potential explanation is insufficient for several reasons. First, supplementary analyses revealed that individuals who reported having different values and beliefs from society, as measured by the Atypical cultural estrangement subscale, did not report more anxiety-depression. In contrast, individuals who reported being different from their peers and not fitting with society, as measured by the Misfit subscale of the CEI (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998) , reported more anxiety-depression. These divergent correlations also were found with a measure of Neuroticism (see Note 2). Thus, even a measure of the self-perceived fit between personal and societal values (Atypical subscale) does not predict subjective well-being strongly, and these subjective discrepancies do not predict subjective well-being as well as the general belief that one does not "fit in" (Misfit subscale).
It may be that feeling estranged from societal values and beliefs (as opposed to feeling one does not "fit in") simply is not negatively associated with subjective wellbeing. This possibility is consistent with Schacht's (1970, p. 239) observation that some writers on alienation perceive estrangement from societal values as a positive experience. In fact, inconsistent and negative correlations between subjective well-being and alienation led .47** EV (personal, self) .45** TV (personal, self) .54*** CV (societal, self) -.10 OV (societal, self) -.06 EV (societal, self) .07 TV (societal, self) .04
NOTE: CV = conservation values; OV = openness values; EV = selfenhancement values; TV = self-transcendence values; self = selfreported; peer = peer-reported; personal = personal values; societal = societal values. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Kohn and Schooler (1983) to argue that cultural estrangement "does not necessarily represent a negative judgement of the self, but often means quite the opposite, that the individual is sufficiently secure in his judgement of self to be independent in his values" (p. 90). That is, people who possess high value discrepancies may be fulfilling important motivations and, therefore, may not experience negative well-being. This idea was supported by our finding that participants who perceived a large gap between their values and societal values possessed a higher need for uniqueness than participants who perceived a smaller gap between personal and societal values. Need for uniqueness was not related to discrepancies between personal and societal political attitudes or to discrepancies between personal and societal mundane attitudes. Thus, value discrepancies may fail to harm subjective wellbeing because the discrepancies fulfill some people's need to feel unique. Our regression analyses in Study 1 supported this hypothesis and prior suggestions that the term cultural estrangement could be reconceptualized for some as "cultural emancipation" (Juni, 1998 (Juni, , p. 1256 .
Another possibility is that value discrepancies may come to reflect estrangement only when they reflect differences between personal values and the values of people or environments that are very important to the individual. Our data from Kohn and Schooler's (1983) measure of cultural estrangement supported this notion because individuals who reported having different opinions to most people in the country were not more anxious-depressed but individuals who reported having different opinions to their peers were more anxiousdepressed (see Table 2 ). These findings are consistent with the evidence from studies on value-self confrontation (Rokeach, 1973) described above and with more recent evidence that estrangement from the values of educational (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000) and work (Rohan & Maiden, 2000) environments affect subjective wellbeing. Thus, "primary group" (friends, family, work) estrangement may be predictive of subjective well-being better than broader cultural estrangement (cf. Perrewe & Hochwarter, 2000) .
Nevertheless, future research should explore the role of social values in estrangement by looking at different populations. In particular, given the documented relation between deviancy and values (e.g., Cochrane, 1971 Cochrane, , 1974 , research should investigate value discrepancies in criminal populations. For example, Feather and Cross (1975) proposed that delinquents' attitudes and behaviors may be determined more by personal values than by societal values. Recent developments in value theory and measurement (e.g., Schwartz, 1992) would allow a stringent test of whether criminal offenders experience value discrepancies that are different from the general population.
In sum, our results indicate that personal and societal value discrepancies are more closely related to cultural estrangement than are discrepancies on political attitudes and discrepancies on mundane attitudes. In particular, cultural estrangement is more likely when people believe that their values are more concerned with the welfare of others than are the values of society. Yet, these value discrepancies do not necessarily lead to poor subjective well-being; instead, they may reflect a desire for uniqueness, supporting Maslow's (1954) assertion that people often "resist enculturation and maintain a certain inner detachment from the culture in which they are immersed" (p. 143). NOTES 1. The self-enhancement values that we used were social power, authority, wealth, successful, capable, and ambitious. The selftranscendence values were protecting the environment, broadminded, equality, world of beauty, helpful, honest, and forgiving. The conservation values were devout, respect for tradition, politeness, selfdiscipline, clean, national security, obedient, and reciprocation of favors. The openness values were daring, varied life, creativity, freedom, independent, pleasure, and enjoying life.
2. Participants also completed the 12-item Neuroticism subscale from the Five-Factor Inventory Measure of Personality (Costa & McCrae, 1991) , but a reviewer pointed out that the role of Neuroticism as a personality trait makes interpretation of this variable problematic. Consequently, we have not reported any of the analysis involving Neuroticism in the results. Nonetheless, Neuroticism was not correlated with any of the three discrepancy indices but was positively correlated with cultural estrangement (Kohn & Schooler, 1983) , r(69) = .24, p < .05, and the Misfit subscale from Cozzarelli and Karafa's (1998) measure of cultural estrangement, r(69) = .28, p < .02, but not with the Atypical subscale, r(69) = .09, ns.
3. Factor analyses also confirmed the existence of two factors. The first factor contained the items in Cozzarelli and Karafa's Atypical subscale, whereas the second factor contained the items in Cozzarelli and Karafa's Misfit subscale. In addition, we replicated Cozzarelli and Karafa's (1998) findings regarding the divergent relation between subjective well-being and the Atypical and Misfit subscales. Specifically, participants' scores on the Misfit subscale were positively correlated with anxiety and depression, r(70) = .44, p < .001, whereas the Atypical subscale was not correlated with anxiety and depression, r(70) = .17, ns. This pattern also was consistent with the correlations we found with Neuroticism (see Note 2). There were significant correlations between need for uniqueness and the Misfit subscale, r(70) = .52, p < .001, and the Atypical subscale, r(70) = .47, p < .001. Finally, a measure of societal alienation (Maddi, Kobosa, & Hoover, 1979 ) was more strongly correlated with the Misfit subscale, r(69) = .39, p < .01, than with the Atypical subscale, r(69) = .26, p < .05. This measure of alienation (which is distinct from estrangement) was included for exploratory purposes and is not reported in any other analyses.
4. It also would be useful to check for distortions in participants' perceptions of societal values. However, we could not reasonably expect peers to estimate participants' perceptions of societal values because these perceptions of societal values should be much less observable in everyday interaction than the participants' personal values. Also, we know of no corpus yielding a complete and valid assessment of British values, and even if one were to exist, it would be difficult to ascertain whether perceptions deviate from this national standard because of mere inaccuracies in perceptions or because of a strong selfreport bias. Thus, this issue was beyond the scope of the present article but remains an interesting topic for future research.
5. There was also no significant correlations between peer-reported personal values and psychological well-being, which was consistent with findings for personal values and well-being, and provided further support for the validity of the participants' value ratings.
